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ABSTRACT
We analyse the initial IP applications of 4,703 start-ups in the 
U.S., distinguishing between trademark and patent applications. 
Our empirical results show that start-ups are more likely to file 
for trademarks instead of patents when entering markets with a 
higher market concentration. Furthermore, we find that start-ups 
that are primarily active in business-to-consumer markets instead 
of business-to-business markets are more likely to file trademarks. 
Finally, the involvement of a venture capitalist (VC) affects the initial 
IP application. VC-backed start-ups are more likely than other start-
ups to file initial IP in the form of trademarks rather than patents. This 
paper contributes to research on the use of IP rights in start-ups and 
to the literature on new venture strategy.
1. Introduction
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) constitute a crucial set of assets and resources for start-ups 
and influence new venture strategy. Traditionally, research on the role of IPRs for small firms 
and start-ups has been patent-focused (e.g. Blind et al. 2006; De Rassenfosse 2012). Recently, 
research on trademarks has gained momentum and has established that trademarks are a 
similarly important form of IPR, particularly for start-ups. Like patents, trademarks have 
been found to be positively related to firm valuations (Sandner and Block 2011; Greenhalgh 
and Rogers 2012), firm survival (Srinivasan, Lilien, and Rangaswamy 2008; Helmers and 
Rogers 2010) and venture capital (VC) funding (Block et al. 2014).
Despite these similarities, trademarks and patents differ in important ways. Most nota-
bly, trademarks and patents reflect different protection intentions: Patents refer to the 
technological aspects of a firms’ business model, whereas trademarks relate to marketing 
aspects, such as the commercialisation of an invention or the protection of a firm’s brands 
(Mendonça, Pereira, and Godinho 2004; Srinivasan, Lilien, and Rangaswamy 2008). Thus, 
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a common argument for why firms file patents versus trademarks is that firms which are 
active in R&D-intensive and technology-oriented industries will typically file for patent 
protection, whereas firms that are active in advertising-intensive, consumer-related and 
service-related industries are more likely to file for trademark protection (Amara, Landry, 
and Traoré 2008; Block et al. 2015).
So far, however, little empirical research exists with regard to the antecedents of a start-
up’s initial IP decision and IP strategy.1 For start-ups, the decision about their initial IP is 
grounded in their overall innovation and new venture strategy, particularly whether it is 
more technology- or more marketing-oriented (e.g. Sandner and Block 2011; Block et al. 
2014).
A start-up’s initial IP decision and its first activities represent the starting point of a 
path-dependent process in the evolution of a new venture strategy. Innovation, entre-
preneurship and business model-related activities are characterised by path dependency 
(Redding 2002; Garnsey, Stam, and Heffernan 2006; Thrane, Blaabjerg, and Møller 2010; 
Valorinta, Schildt, and Lamberg 2011; Greve and Seidel 2015): past events or decisions 
influence future events and decisions (i.e. future decisions are conditioned by historical 
events) (Coombs and Hull 1998; Sydow, Schreyögg, and Koch 2009). The founder’s initial 
decisions shape his or her start-up’s evolution, and have a long-lasting impact on its organi-
sation, business model and strategy; this phenomenon is known as founder imprinting (e.g. 
Nelson 2003; Hsu and Lim 2014; Boling, Pieper, and Covin 2016). Thus, a start-up’s initial 
IPR decision – to trademark or to patent – reflects, and at the same time influences, the 
evolution of the start-up as well as its business model and strategy. As a result of these initial 
decisions, start-ups can become constrained, overly focused on some particular dimensions 
of strategy, or even locked-in with regard to their strategy and IPR applications (Sydow, 
Schreyögg, and Koch 2009; Thrane, Blaabjerg, and Møller 2010). Thus, a start-up’s initial 
IPR application has far-reaching implications, and is therefore a highly relevant area of 
investigation from both a theoretical and practical point of view.
We examine the initial IPR application (trademark or patent) of 4,703 U.S. start-ups 
between 1998 and 2007. Our results show that, as market concentration increases, start-ups 
are more likely to file trademarks instead of patents as their initial IP rights. Second, we 
find that start-ups focusing on business-to-consumer (B2C) markets are more likely to file 
for trademarks compared to start-ups serving business-to-business (B2B) markets. Third, 
we find that the involvement of a VC firm leads to a higher likelihood of filing the initial 
IP in the form of a trademark instead of a patent.
Our findings contribute to the literature on small firms’ and start-ups’ IPR usage (e.g. 
Amara, Landry, and Traoré 2008; Thomä and Bizer 2013; Flikkema, De Man, and Castaldi 
2014). To date, the existing literature has investigated the motives of small- and medi-
um-sized enterprises and start-ups when filing IPRs and the resulting effects. However, 
the initial decision of filing a trademark or a patent has not been assessed thus far. Our 
study also contributes to the broader literature on new venture strategy (Carter et al. 1994; 
McGee, Dowling, and Megginson 1995; Lee, Lim, and Tan 1999) and its evolution (e.g. 
Garnsey, Stam, and Heffernan 2006). Filing patents can be associated with differentiation 
strategies based on technology (Arundel 2001; Blind et al. 2006; Veer and Jell 2012), whereas 
1throughout the paper, a start-up’s ‘initial IP decision’ refers to whether a start-up files a trademark or a patent as its first IPr.
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trademarks can be associated with marketing-based differentiation strategies (Mendonça, 
Pereira, and Godinho 2004; Srinivasan, Lilien, and Rangaswamy 2008; Flikkema, De Man, 
and Castaldi 2014). Thus, our study investigates the antecedents of filing trademarks or 
patents as an initial IP right, while also providing information on whether a start-up’s overall 
strategy is more technology- or marketing-oriented.
Finally, our study contributes to the growing literature on the relationship between IPRs 
and VC financing. This literature shows that start-ups filing patents have a higher likelihood 
of receiving VC funds in the first place (Cao and Hsu 2011; Haeussler, Harhoff, and Müller 
2012; Hoenen et al. 2014) and that patents show a positive relationship with subsequent 
start-up valuations by VCs (Lerner 1994; Baum and Silverman 2004; Hsu and Ziedonis 
2008). Recent research further shows that, in addition to patents, VCs also value trade-
marks for their protection and signalling value (Block et al. 2014). VCs are active investors 
with strong control rights. They advise start-up firms, shaping their strategies and business 
models (Sahlman 1990; Schefczyk and Gerpott 2001; Gompers and Lerner 2004). This 
influence most likely has an additional effect on the start-up’s initial IP decisions. However, 
to date, we know little about this particular influence of VCs. Our study helps close this 
knowledge gap and contributes to the discussion on how VCs influence start-ups’ strategies 
(Hellmann and Puri 2002; Bertoni, Colombo, and Grilli 2011) and how they drive start-
ups’ IPR applications.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides background 
information on the motives for filing trademarks and patents and develops our hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes our data and variables. Section 4 presents the descriptive and multi-
variate results, which are then discussed in Section 5. Section 6 presents the conclusions of 
our study and details limitations and avenues for future research.
2. Conceptual framework and hypotheses
2.1. Start-ups’ motives for filing trademarks and patents
A firm’s motives for filing trademarks or patents are multifold and have sparked a consider-
able amount of research (e.g. Cohen, Richard, and Walsh 2000; Blind et al. 2006; Flikkema, 
De Man, and Castaldi 2014; Block et al. 2015). Briefly summarised, the reasons to file a 
patent can be grouped into protection, blocking, reputation, exchange and incentive motives 
(Blind et al. 2006). Similarly, trademarks are filed for protection, reputation and exchange 
reasons. Blocking and incentive motives do not apply for trademarks (Block et al. 2015).
2.1.1. Protection motives
The core function of both patents and trademarks is to protect IP assets (Cohen, Richard, 
and Walsh 2000; Block et al. 2015). The fundamental difference between patents and trade-
marks is that patents protect a firm’s technological assets and capabilities (e.g. Blind et al. 
2006; Thomä and Bizer 2013). By contrast, trademarks protect a firm’s marketing assets. 
By protecting symbols and names, trademarks are supposed to distinguish a firm and its 
products or services from competitors in the eyes of the firm’s customers (Mendonça, 
Pereira, and Godinho 2004; Fosfuri and Giarratana 2009). Trademarks provide the legal 
basis for brands and indicate a firm’s willingness to protect its brands against competitors 
(Mendonça, Pereira, and Godinho 2004; Sandner and Block 2011).
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2.1.2. Reputation motives
Another important motive for filing patents and trademarks is building a reputation (e.g. 
Blind et al. 2006; Block et al. 2015).2 Trademarks help build a reputation with customers. 
They reduce the search costs of customers by signalling a higher product quality via brands 
(Srinivasan, Lilien, and Rangaswamy 2008). In contrast to trademarks, patents represent 
the technological capabilities of a firm and help build a positive technological image with 
customers and other stakeholders (e.g. Blind et al. 2006; Veer and Jell 2012).
2.1.3. Exchange motives
Exchange motives refer to facilitating a relationship with external partners to acquire fund-
ing or licensing income. Trademarks indicate a start-up’s marketing orientation (Srinivasan, 
Lilien, and Rangaswamy 2008; Block et al. 2014). In this manner, they can increase a start-
up’s attractiveness to external investors and reduce funding costs (e.g. Ramello and Silva 
2006; Srinivasan, Lilien, and Rangaswamy 2008). The same can be true for patents, which 
indicate a start-up’s technological and innovation capabilities to potential capital providers 
(e.g. De Rassenfosse 2012; Veer and Jell 2012).
Based on these differences between trademarks and patents regarding protection, rep-
utation and exchange motives, we now develop hypotheses on how market concentration, 
customer type and VC funding influence start-ups’ initial IP applications.
2.2. Hypotheses
2.2.1. Market concentration and start-ups’ initial IP applications
Market concentration describes the sum of the market share of the largest firms that are 
active within a particular market (e.g. Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen 1986; Harris 
1998). We argue that market concentration influences a start-up’s initial decision of filing 
a trademark or a patent. The argumentation is twofold.
First, market concentration and entry barriers are interconnected (Caves and Porter 
1977; McAfee, Mialon, and Williams 2004). Markets with a low concentration oftentimes 
also have low entry barriers. In such markets, it is relatively easy for start-ups to become 
operational. Trademarks and branding play an important role in this regard, given that they 
help the start-up to pursue a product quality-based differentiation strategy and communi-
cate its unique selling proposition to customers (Srinivasan, Lilien, and Rangaswamy 2008). 
In markets with low entry barriers, start-ups tend to rely more heavily on trademarks as a 
basic branding instrument to create a competitive advantage (Abimbola 2001). In markets 
with high concentration, the situation is different. Incumbents have a strong and powerful 
position, and entry barriers are often high (Besanko et al. 2010). To enter such markets, 
innovation (often radical or disruptive) is needed. Therefore, patents play an important 
role in the start-up’s market entry strategy, given that they support the start-up in appro-
priating returns on innovations (Arundel 2001; Thomä and Bizer 2013). When entering 
a concentrated market, a patent will exclude incumbent firms from the use of a start-up’s 
technological knowledge and thus helps capture some initial market share (Blind et al. 2006). 
Without the strong protection of the core knowledge of a start-up, it becomes more difficult 
to pose a credible threat to incumbent firms that are in control of the resources within an 
2In the context of trademarks, Block et al. (2015) refer to the reputation motives as ‘marketing motives.’
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industry. Prior research shows that start-ups with protected novel technical knowledge can 
indeed pose a great threat to established, powerful incumbents (Abernathy and Clark 1984; 
Henderson 1993; Hill and Rothaermel 2003).
Second, a high market concentration often implies low competition (e.g. Domowitz, 
Hubbard, and Petersen 1986; Harris 1998).3 Overall, the filing of a trademark should become 
more relevant when customers have several similar firms to choose from in their purchasing 
decisions. When market concentration is low, there exist more competing firms and a start-
up’s needs to build visibility and increase its reputation by branding. As described above, 
trademarks, being the legal anchor of brands, represent a powerful tool that can be used 
to build a strong link between the start-up and its customers. That is, trademarks enable a 
start-up to differentiate itself from its competitors (e.g. Mendonça, Pereira, and Godinho 
2004; Sandner and Block 2011).
Taking these two lines of arguments, we propose the following:
Hypothesis 1: Start-ups in less concentrated markets are more likely than start-ups in highly 
concentrated markets to file the initial IP in the form of a trademark rather than a patent.
2.2.2. Customer type (B2C vs. B2B markets) and start-ups’ initial IP applications
The main customer type is another important market characteristic that influences a start-
up’s initial IP decisions. Here, we distinguish between start-ups that primarily operate in 
B2C markets and start-ups that primarily operate in B2B markets. The main customers of 
start-ups in B2C markets are end customers, whereas start-ups in B2B markets primarily 
serve business customers.
Prior marketing research has found considerable differences between B2B and B2C 
markets (Edwards, Gut, and Mavondo 2007). For example, it has been found that end cus-
tomers rely more on brands as quality signals compared to business customers. Building 
on this finding, we argue that the signalling function of trademarks should be of higher 
importance in B2C markets than in B2B markets (Ahmed and D’Astous 1995; Edwards, 
Gut, and Mavondo 2007). The reason is that business customers in B2B markets are often 
experts themselves and can judge product quality without having to rely on a product 
brand as a signal for product quality. Moreover, they mostly engage in long-term customer 
relationships, reducing the need for signalling through brands. In B2C markets, a patent 
might be a more valuable quality signal than trademarks, given that having a patent shows 
that a start-up has strong innovation and technology capabilities.
Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Start-ups that primarily serve end customers are more likely than start-ups that 
primarily serve business customers to file the initial IP in the form of a trademark rather than 
a patent.
2.2.3. VC funding and start-ups’ initial IP applications
VCs are active investors who not only provide funding, but also spend a considerable amount 
of time advising and monitoring the management of the start-ups in their portfolios. VCs 
often have a powerful role in the start-ups’ supervisory boards and have the ability to fire 
3although a higher market concentration oftentimes also corresponds to a higher competition or market power, this notion 
does not have to be true for every market. Because the market concentration used in this study only focuses on the top firms 
within a market, the remaining competitors in a market are not accounted for. Hence, there is some debate surrounding 
this subject (e.g. schmalensee 1989).
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the members of a start-up’s management team. Prior research shows that VCs influence 
and shape a start-up’s strategy (Sahlman 1990; Schefczyk and Gerpott 2001; Gompers and 
Lerner 2004). We argue that the involvement of a VC is likely to shift a start-up’s focus from 
the development towards the commercialisation of its inventions.
The extant literature shows that VCs find early stage start-ups to be overly focused on the 
development of their inventions. VCs are of the opinion that start-ups should be consum-
er-oriented and conduct market analysis (Hisrich 1989; Hills, Hultman, and Miles 2008). 
When deciding to invest, VCs set milestones that a start-up needs to achieve to receive 
subsequent rounds of funding. In early stages, such milestones are directed towards market 
orientation, making the product more consumer-friendly and acquiring initial consum-
ers who are willing to buy the product (Berkery 2008). Accordingly, the involvement of 
a VC is likely to shorten a start-up’s time-to-market and speed up the professionalisation 
of marketing activities compared to non-VC-funded start-ups (Hellmann and Puri 2000, 
2002). VCs only have a limited time period in which to turn a start-up into a functioning 
company that can either be sold through an IPO or through a trade sale to an incumbent. 
Thus, VCs seek to bring a product to market as early as possible. The filing of a trademark 
is likely to be one of the initial steps taken in the commercialisation process, securing the 
start-up’s brand name and protecting its future marketing efforts (Sandner and Block 2011).
Hence, we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Start-ups funded by VCs are more likely than start-ups not funded by VCs to file 
the initial IP in the form of a trademark rather than a patent.
3. Data
3.1. Data sources and sample
To construct our sample, we used Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert database and retrieved 
information on all U.S.-based start-ups that received VC funding in the period from 1998 
to 2007 (11,808 firms). We were unable to take into account data beyond 2007 due to the 
lengthy process surrounding patent applications and the successive granting of international 
patent protection (Greenhalgh and Rogers 2010).
We defined the start-up’s market by the six-digit NAICS code available from VentureXpert. 
For each NAICS classification, we used COMPUSTAT to calculate the three-year averages of 
R&D and advertising intensity over our sample period (1998–2007). COMPUSTAT data are 
commonly used in existing studies to calculate such measures (e.g. Chauvin and Hirschey 
1993; Waring 1996). Additionally, we obtained data on market concentration, which is 
published by the U.S. Census Bureau every five years. The competition data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau is reliable, given that each firm in the U.S. is required by law to respond to 
the U.S. Census Survey (e.g. Ali, Klasa, and Yeung 2009).
We obtained information regarding the trademarks and patents of the sampled firms 
through a semi-manual process. The trademark applications were obtained from the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) (see also Graham et al. 2013). The U.S. Patent 
applications were obtained from PATSTAT, one of the most comprehensive databases on pat-
ents to date. The extent of IP activities could be determined for 10,128 of the start-ups in our 
sample (85.7%). Imperfect matches were verified through the industry and location records 
available from VentureXpert. Excluding start-ups that filed a first trademark or patent 
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prior to 1998 and excluding observations with missing data on other variables reduced 
our sample to 6,095 firms. The final sample includes 4,703 firms that filed a trademark or 
patent between 1998 and 2007 and 2,022 firms that filed neither a trademark nor a patent.
3.2. Variables
Our dependent variable is the binary variable trademark or patent, indicating whether a 
start-up filed its first IP application in the form of a trademark (=1) or a patent (=0). We 
use the respective application dates because they closely relate to the point in time when 
the start-up made its IP decision and are not blurred by the publication process.
Regarding our independent variables, we measured market concentration as the sum of 
the market share of the four largest firms that are active within a particular NAICS class, also 
known as the C4 ratio (e.g. Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen 1986; Harris 1998). Because 
concentration data are published every 5 years by the U.S. Census Bureau, we used the C4 
ratio that was published in 1997 (2002) for the start-ups in our sample that had applied 
for an initial IP right up until 2002 (2007).4 A start-up’s main customer type was captured 
by three dummy variables. The dummy variable Customer type: B2C captures whether a 
start-up is primarily active in B2C markets, whereas the dummy variable Customer type: 
B2B indicates that a start-up is primarily active in B2B markets. The dummy Customer type: 
other captures whether firms had multiple or other main customer types. The data were 
obtained from VentureXpert. Finally, we included a dummy variable (VC dummy) indi-
cating whether the start-up received VC funding up until the date of its first IP application 
(coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). Note that this variable could only be calculated for firms 
that filed for trademarks or patents.
We include a wide range of control variables. First, we control for the average indus-
try R&D intensity and the average industry advertising intensity, which are calculated for 
each individual market in COMPUSTAT over the three years prior to a start-up’s initial 
IP application. It is important to control for these factors because start-ups that operate in 
research-intensive industries are more likely to file patent applications (Griliches 1998). Such 
industries are likely to be science-based. Similarly, a higher industry advertising intensity 
may be related to a more trademark-oriented IP strategy (Mendonça, Pereira, and Godinho 
2004).
Second, we control for start-up age in years at the date of a start-up’s first IP application. 
To control for the resource endowment of a company, we include the variable money received 
(log.), which captures the total amount of VC funding a firm collected until 2007. Third, 
given that IP protection regimes or mechanisms may vary across different industry types 
(Amara, Landry, and Traoré 2008; Dushnitsky and Shaver 2009), we include six industry 
dummies, categorised by VentureXpert: ‘biotechnology,’ ‘communications and media,’ ‘com-
puter related,’ ‘medical/health/life science,’ ‘non-high-technology’ and ‘semiconductors/
other electronics.’ To control for time trends in trademark or patent applications, we use 10 
application year dummies to indicate the year in which the start-up applied for its first IP. 
Time-related shifts in environmental, managerial or legal conditions may affect IP appli-
cations (Kortum and Lerner 1999). Finally, possible regional influences are controlled for 
4an alternative to using the C4 ratio would be to use a convex function of the market share such, as a Herfindahl–Hirschman 
index. However, we were not able to compute such an index with the data available.
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by 17 U.S. region dummies because the type and degree of regional technology orientation 
(e.g. Silicon Valley, New England) may affect IP behaviour (Audretsch and Feldmann 1996).
4. Analysis
4.1. Descriptive results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our sample, including firms that did not file 
a trademark or patent. Of the 4,703 start-ups in our sample that filed an IPR, 60.8% filed 
for a trademark first instead of a patent. This preference could be explained by the slightly 
broader applicability of trademarks, which is potentially relevant for both the technology- 
and service-related markets, whereas patents are especially relevant in technology-based 
markets (Greenhalgh and Rogers 2006; Block et al. 2015).
We find considerable variation in the market concentration. Although the average con-
centration is 36.2%, the market with the lowest concentration is dental services (NAICS 
classification = 621210), with a C4 ratio of 0.7%. By contrast, the market with the highest 
concentration is the manufacturing of space vehicles (NAICS classification = 336,414), with 
a C4 ratio of 91.6%. To assess potential differences between firms that filed an IPR and firms 
that did not, Table 1 shows the mean values of the two samples. With regard to market 
concentration, there exist only small differences between the two samples. Regarding main 
customer type, Table 1 shows that most start-ups in our sample operate in B2B markets: 
60.3% of start-ups operate in B2B markets, whereas only 12.9% of start-ups operate in B2C 
markets. The B2B share, however, is significantly higher among firms that file IPRs. With 
regard to VC financing, we observe that 40.3% of the start-ups in our sample had received 
VC funding before applying for their first IP right. Note that this variable cannot be calcu-
lated if a firm did not file a trademark or patent application.
Regarding our control variables, we observe an average industry R&D intensity of 13.5% 
of sales and an average advertising intensity of 1.4% of sales. Both measures are right-skewed 
(e.g. maximum R&D intensity is 2,456.7%). As a robustness check, we correct for this phe-
nomenon by taking only those NAICS sectors into account for which we have R&D and 
advertising intensity information for at least five firms (which resulted in a mean industry 
R&D intensity of 11.5% and a maximum value of 38.9%). Finally, the average start-up’s 
age was 3.3 years and it received 18.5 million USD (log = 2.919) until 2007. Because of 
the skewed nature of this variable, we include the variable in logged form. Note that this 
variable shows a comparatively large difference between firms that filed an IPR and firms 
that did not. The reason is that, for those start-ups that did not file an IP application, the 
firm age from the year 2007 was taken. Finally, the industry dummies show that most of 
our firms (46.9%) are active in computer-related industries such as computer software and 
services and internet-related activities. There exist considerable differences regarding indus-
try between firms that filed an IPR and firms that did not. For example, 19.3% of the firms 
that did not file an IPR belong to the non-high-technology category, whereas only 10.4% 
of the firms that did file an IPR belong to this category. Concerning a start-up’s customer 
type, we find that start-ups are most likely to sell to end consumers in the medical and life 
science industry (37.8%) and in the non-high-tech industry (35.1%).
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Table 3. Probit regression (incl. Heckman model) with the dependent variable: trademark (=1) or patent 
(=0).
Notes. standard errors are clustered on six-digit naICs sectors (in parentheses). reference group for IP application year: 
2001; reference u.s. region: ‘silicon valley’; reference industry: ‘communications and media.’
athe variable Received VC before application as well as the application year dummies could not be included in the selec-
tion equation because values only exist if a firm filed a trademark or patent.
bCalculated until the first IPr application. For firms that did not file IPr, these variables are calculated until 31 december 
2007.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Variable Hyp. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Outcome equation
Industry r&d intensity −0.000 −0.000* −0.000 −0.000 −0.000* −0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry advertising 
intensity
0.034** 0.041*** 0.031** 0.034** 0.037** 0.037**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
age at application (log.) 0.341*** 0.343*** 0.359*** 0.223*** 0.242*** 0.202***
(0.053) (0.049) (0.050) (0.077) (0.071) (0.028)
Money received (log.) −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.024* −0.023* −0.025*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Market concentration H1 (+) −0.003* −0.003* −0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Main customer type: B2C H2 (+) 0.242*** 0.239*** 0.235***
(0.070) (0.069) (0.072)
Main customer type: other 0.053 0.052 0.047
(0.049) (0.050) (0.052)
received vC before 
application
H3 (+) 0.243*** 0.248*** 0.259***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.044)
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Selection equationa
Industry r&d intensityb 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 –
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) –
Industry advertising 
intensityb
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 –
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) –
age at application (log.)b −1.526*** −1.526*** −1.525*** −1.527*** −1.527*** –
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) –
Money received (log.) 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.024
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Market concentrationb −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 –
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) –
Main customer type: B2C −0.200** −0.200** −0.214** −0.208** −0.213** –
(0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.088) (0.090) –
Main customer type: other −0.235*** −0.235*** −0.238*** −0.236*** −0.237*** –
(0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) –
time first fund. round 
(log.)
0.419*** 0.419*** 0.419*** 0.415*** 0.415*** –
(0.072) (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) –
actors invested in the 
start-up
−0.049*** −0.049*** −0.050*** −0.049*** −0.049*** –
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) –
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
observations 6,095 6,095 6,095 6,095 6,095 4,703
naICs sectors 390 390 390 390 390 333
rho (Wald-test) −0.223* −0.225* −0.252** −0.066 −0.096 –
Lr-test (vs. Model 1) – 6.134** 14.213*** 27.469*** 47.873*** –
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Table 2 shows the correlations and variance inflation factors (VIFs). The directions of 
the reported correlations are in line with our hypothesised effects. The VIFs are below 2.5, 
indicating that multicollinearity is unlikely to pose a problem in our estimations.
4.2. Multivariate results
Table 3 shows the results of several Probit regressions with the dependent variable trade-
mark or patent. Focusing only on firms that filed a trademark or patent might introduce a 
selection bias. The descriptive statistics (Table 1) reveal differences between start-ups that 
filed an IP application and start-ups that did not. To correct for this selection bias, we esti-
mate a two-step Heckman Probit model (Heckman 1979; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 
1999). Model 1 only includes the control variables. In the selection equation, we include 
all variables of the outcome equation, with the exception of variables that can only be esti-
mated if a company filed an IPR (i.e. whether a company received VC funding before the 
IP application and the application year dummies). Because specifying a sufficient selection 
equation requires additional variables that are not included in the outcome equation, we 
additionally include the time elapsed since first funding round (log.) and the number of 
investors. Both variables have a significant impact and should influence a start-up’s decision 
to file an IPR or not, while not necessarily influencing the decision of filing a trademark or 
a patent. A significant Rho coefficient, which quantifies the correlation between the error 
terms of the selection and the outcome equation, indicates that a selection bias is present.
Model 1 includes all of the control variables. All models include standard errors clustered 
at the NAICS level. The independent variables are entered subsequently in the following 
models. Model 2 includes market concentration, which shows a positive and significant 
effect (p < 0.1). As hypothesised in H1, an increase in market concentration leads to a 
higher likelihood of filing the first IP right in the form of a trademark instead of a patent. 
This effect also persists if all variables are entered jointly in Model 6 (p < 0.1), thus lending 
support for H1. Customer-type dummy variables are added in Model 3. The results show 
that a focus on B2C markets instead of B2B markets leads to a higher likelihood of filing 
trademarks instead of patents as a first IP right (p < 0.01 in Model 3 or p < 0.01 in Model 
6). This finding supports H2 and is in line with our argument that start-ups active in B2C 
markets use trademarks or brands to differentiate themselves from their competitors from 
an end customer’s perspective. Finally, in Model 4, we introduce the VC dummy variable. 
The coefficient shows that start-ups funded by VCs are more likely to file their first IP right 
in the form of a trademark than a patent (p < 0.01). This finding provides support for our 
third hypothesis, H3. All variables are entered simultaneously in Model 5. The results of 
the independent variables remain unchanged. However, the Rho coefficient becomes insig-
nificant, indicating that a sample selection should not bias the estimation. Therefore, we 
also estimate Model 5 without accounting for a potential selection effect. Again, the results 
regarding the main independent variables remain largely unchanged (Model 6).
With regard to the control variables, the results show that R&D intensity has no effect 
on the choice between a trademark and patent, whereas a higher advertising intensity 
promotes trademark applications. Additionally, industry differences emerge: for example, 
compared to the reference category ‘communications and media,’ firms in ‘biotechnology,’ 
‘medical/life sciences’ and ‘semiconductors/other electronics’ are more likely to file patents, 
whereas trademarks are more likely to be filed by firms active in ‘computer-related’ and 
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‘non-high-technology’ industries. Finally, younger start-ups are more likely to file for patents 
rather than trademarks as their first IP right. This effect is in line with existing studies that 
indicate that start-ups tend to be overly focused on their inventions instead of showing a 
greater market orientation during the early stages of their venture (Hisrich 1989; Wortman, 
Spann, and Adams 1989).
4.3. Additional analyses and robustness checks
The estimated effect of VC funding before filing an initial IP right may suffer from a selec-
tion bias. Start-ups that received VC funding before filing an initial IP right might differ 
structurally from other start-ups (e.g. with regard to the start-up’s business models, age and 
economic conditions). Propensity score matching is a method of correcting this selection 
bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983), comparing the initial IP rights of VC-backed start-ups 
(treatment group) to the initial IP rights of start-ups that are not VC-backed but are oth-
erwise as similar as possible (control group).
The propensity scores were estimated by a Probit regression on the VC dummy. All 
available variables used in our main analysis were included as independent variables in this 
estimation. On the basis of the estimated propensity scores, VC-backed start-ups (treatment 
group) were matched with start-ups that had not yet received any VC funds (control group). 
The results show that VC-backed start-ups were on average 5.9–13.2% more likely to file 
the initial IP in the form of a trademark rather than a patent. The size of the effect differs 
with the matching algorithm used (see Table 4).
Our R&D and advertising industry intensity measures are strongly right-skewed. This 
phenomenon is mostly because some industry sectors only include a few individual firms 
that drive the intensity measures. As a robustness check, we account for this phenomenon 
by only including sectors with at least five firms, thereby reducing the skewness of these 
measures. This step reduces our sample to 3,966 start-ups that are active in 216 different 
NAICS classifications. The regression results, presented in Table 5 (Model 2), show a nega-
tively significant effect of R&D intensity while also showing a highly significant and positive 
effect of advertising intensity on trademark applications. All other results remain unchanged.
Next, we exclude firms that filed a trademark and patent application within a period of 
six months. Given that the filings occurred in such a short period of time, there may be no 
clear preference for either a trademark or a patent. Furthermore, this exclusion reduces a 
potential bias due to errors or delays in the recording of the application dates or due to the 
differences between the filing systems of patents and trademarks. This step reduces our 
Table 4. Propensity score matching analysis of a potential vC selection effect.
Notes. sample includes start-ups that filed a trademark or patent only.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Matching algorithm
N treatment 
group
N control 
group
average treat-
ment effect
Standard 
error t-statistic
nearest neighbour matching 
(replacement)
1,889 2,807 0.059 0.219 2.71
nearest neighbour matching 
(no replacement)
1,889 1,889 0.010 0.013 7.38
Kernel matching 1,889 2,807 0.063 0.017 3.73
radius matching 1,889 2,807 0.132 0.015 8.73
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sample to 3,891 start-ups that are active in 319 NAICS sectors. As reported in Model 3 of 
Table 5, the results regarding our hypothesised effects remain similar to the results from 
our main analyses.
Finally, the VentureXpert database contains additional information on the VC funding of 
the sampled firms which can be grouped into round characteristics and VC characteristics. 
Because this information is only available for firms that received VC funds, our sample is 
reduced to 1,811 observations. For example, VCs categorise a start-up as being in a specific 
venture stage, differentiating as to whether a start-up is still working on its first prototype or 
if it is already in a later venture stage, working on initial sales, expanding its market share 
or, ultimately, looking for an exit. Furthermore, we are able to control for the funding stage 
(round number), the amount of VC funds received, the number of investors involved, the 
VCs’ experience and maturity levels and the different types of VC investors (VC firm, busi-
ness angel, corporate investor, financial institution, governmental investor). Each specific 
Table 5. robustness checks.
Notes. standard errors are clustered on six-digit naICs sectors (in parentheses). reference group for IP application year: 
2001; reference u.s. region: ‘silicon valley’; reference industry: ‘communications and media.’
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Main model 
(=Model 7, 
Table 4)
r&D and adver-
tising intensity 
based on at 
least five firms
TM and patent 
application 
>6 months 
apart
Controlling for 
additional VC 
information
Industry r&d intensity −0.000 −0.010** −0.000* −0.001**
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry advertising intensity 0.038** 0.051*** 0.040* 0.071**
(0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.030)
age at application (log.) 0.205*** 0.218*** 0.235*** 0.071
(0.028) (0.031) (0.034) (0.060)
Market concentration −0.003* −0.003* −0.004** −0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Main customer type: B2C 0.235*** 0.158** 0.293*** 0.340**
(0.072) (0.076) (0.073) (0.167)
Main customer type: other 0.052 0.026 0.067 0.025
(0.051) (0.053) (0.050) (0.112)
received vC before application 0.246*** 0.243*** 0.272***
(0.044) (0.052) (0.051)
Round characteristics
round number 0.011
(0.044)
syndicate size −0.011
(0.042)
Funding amount (log.) 0.149***
(0.053)
VC characteristics
vC experience (log.) 0.073*
(0.039)
vC age (log.) −0.133
(0.084)
Investor type dummies no no no yes
start-up development dummies no no no yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
year/region dummies yes yes yes yes
observations 4,703 3,966 3,891 1,811
naICs sectors 333 216 319 207
Pseudo R² 0.127 0.133 0.176 0.115
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VC actor type operates under a different set of incentives and may therefore influence the 
start-up’s management in a different manner (Sorenson and Stuart 2008; Dushnitsky and 
Shapira 2010). Even when controlling for these variables, the effects of our independent 
variables market concentration (ß = −0.015, p < 0.05) and customer type: B2C (p < 0.01) 
remain unchanged, thus further underlining the robustness of our results.
5. Discussion of results
Prior research has investigated the link between market structure and appropriability condi-
tions or regimes (Teece 1986; Arora 1997; Leiponen and Byma 2009). Based on Schumpeter 
(1950) and Arrow (1962), it is argued that a temporary monopoly granted by patents stim-
ulates innovation and improves the appropriability of innovation rents. Market power pro-
vides a strong incentive to invest in R&D, which then increases the need for IP protection 
and patenting. Thus, markets with a high concentration and incumbents with high market 
power are characterised by high R&D investments and high patenting. Start-up entrants 
are aware of these phenomena and build on patents rather than trademarks as a pathway 
to enter such concentrated markets. Prior research has indicated that patents function as 
a stronger exclusion right than trademarks, given that patents can be used as an effective 
means to block competitors, whereas trademarks cannot (Block et al. 2015). Although a 
patent can exclude firms from the use of a start-up’s technological knowledge, a trademark 
does not have such a strong exclusion power. Competitors can circumvent the trademark 
by conducting their business under a different brand name. Our findings that start-ups in 
highly concentrated markets are more likely to file patents rather than trademarks as initial 
IP rights is in line with this argumentation.
Our findings on the effect of market concentration on initial IP filings are also in line 
with Sutton (2007), who classifies R&D and advertising as endogenous sunk costs. He fur-
ther argues that the investments needed to reach incumbents’ economies of scale constitute 
exogenous sunk cost that entrants need to carry or overcome. Entry barriers and market 
concentration are determined by endogenous and exogenous sunk costs. Through our market 
concentration variable, we indirectly examine how exogenous sunk costs influence start-ups’ 
initial IP decisions. We find that start-ups that are attempting to enter markets with high entry 
barriers and high exogenous sunk costs (resulting from economies of scale) file for patents 
rather than trademarks as first IP rights. To enter such markets, an entry strategy based 
on patented technological knowledge can pose a strong and credible threat to incumbents 
(Abernathy and Clark 1984; Henderson 1993; Hill and Rothaermel 2003). Trademarks, in 
turn, are more valuable in markets with differentiated goods, where exogenous sunk costs and 
market entry barriers are low. In such markets, they help the start-up to build and maintain 
strong visibility among the large number of firms that are active in the market.
Previous studies find that VCs influence the start-up’s financial performance (Schefczyk 
and Gerpott 2001; Fitza, Matusik, and Mosakowski 2009), professionalisation (Hellmann 
and Puri 2002), time-to-market (Hellmann and Puri 2000), growth rate (Davila, Foster, and 
Gupta 2003) and survival chances (Manigart, Baeyens, and Van Hyfte 2002). Our findings 
add to this literature, showing that VCs also influence the IP management or IP strategy of 
start-ups, increasing the likelihood of filing the initial IP in the form of trademarks rather 
than patents. VCs are active investors with strong control rights who advise and monitor 
the start-ups in which they invest (Sahlman 1990; Gompers and Lerner 2004). VCs exert 
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pressure on the start-up to commercialise its knowledge and inventions by setting mile-
stones related to market orientation and/or initial revenues (Hisrich 1989; Hellmann and 
Puri 2000, 2002; Berkery 2008). Filing a trademark can be interpreted as a first step towards 
commercialisation and can be such a milestone.
However, our finding that VC funding increases the likelihood of trademarks rather 
than patents as initial IP rights can also reflect a selection effect. In that case, VCs do not 
actively push start-ups towards trademarking but rather have a preference for investing in 
start-ups that are close to the commercialisation of a product. Trademarks are a signal or an 
indicator of a start-up’s market orientation and revenue potential (Sandner and Block 2011). 
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to disentangle the selection from the treatment 
effect, and we cannot establish the exact direction and mechanism of how VCs influence 
trademarking as opposed to patenting.
6. Conclusions
We analyse the determinants of the initial filing of a trademark or patent for 4,703 start-ups 
in the U.S. Our results show that market concentration, customer type and VC funding 
influence this decision. Start-ups are more likely to file a trademark instead of a patent as 
their initial IP rights when operating in markets with a low concentration, when being 
active in B2C instead of B2B markets and when having received VC funding beforehand.
Our findings have practical implications for both start-ups and policy-makers. For start-
ups, our results suggest that venture capitalists take an active role in new ventures: they 
not only provide funding, but also push start-ups towards the swifter commercialisation 
and marketing of their inventions. This is because VCs typically seek to bring a product to 
market as early as possible. Our results show that firms that received VC support are more 
likely to file trademarks as their initial IP rights than other start-ups. Hence, VC providers 
not only select innovative firms, but also influence these firms’ strategies, pushing them 
towards the rapid commercialisation and marketing of their products (Colombo and Grilli 
2010; Samila and Sorenson 2010). Start-ups seeking money from VCs should be aware of 
this influence and should take this into account when considering the pros and cons of VC 
financing. While a greater market orientation and focus on marketing might be useful and 
highly appreciated for certain ventures and entrepreneurs, start-ups that are still further 
away from the commercialisation phase in their innovation process might find this influence 
disturbing and distracting.
With respect to policy-makers attempting to improve start-ups’ IPR usage, our study 
provides useful information about the sectors and conditions under which trademarks are 
typically preferred over patents as the initial IP rights, and vice versa. This information can 
be used to design and/or improve initiatives intended to strengthen start-ups’ IPR usage, 
which is one of the main goals of policy-makers aiming to foster innovative entrepreneur-
ship and the evolution of innovative start-ups (Block, Fisch, and van Praag, forthcoming; 
European Commission 2015).
Our paper has several limitations that provide guidance for further research. First, 
our empirical analysis only considers the very initial IPR applications of start-ups and 
excludes subsequent filings. It might be that start-ups decide to file both a patent and 
a trademark in close succession, and do not place much thought on whether to file a 
trademark or a patent first. Although studying follow-up filings and their determinants 
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is a promising endeavour for future research, we account for the filing of a trademark 
and patent within 6 months of each other in our robustness checks. The primary results 
remain unchanged. Second, our data-set is constructed from several different data sources. 
IP data are gathered through a matching process relying on the manual creation of com-
pany name patterns that were used to extract information on trademark and patent 
filings. Although this method was cross-validated with records in the USPTO trademark 
register, we cannot completely rule out possible mismatches or the potential failure to 
include relevant IP applications in our data-set. Third, it still remains unclear what the 
exact mechanisms behind our findings are. As illustrated above, it is unclear whether 
our conclusion that VC-backed start-ups rely more on trademarks than on patents is due 
to a selection or a treatment effect. In other words: we do not know whether VCs push 
their start-ups to file for trademarks, or whether VCs actively select start-ups that have 
short-term revenue potential and are anyway close to filing a trademark, regardless of the 
VC’s involvement. Finally, our paper only considers two particular formal IP protection 
mechanisms, namely patents and trademarks. However, the previous literature shows 
that other formal IP protection mechanisms are generally of lower importance for small 
firms (e.g. Arundel 2001; Leiponen and Byma 2009).
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